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A considerable amount of research attention has been directed at
the relationship between perceptions of the certainty and severity of le-
gal punishment and involvement in criminal behavior.' A recent article
by Grasmick and Green 2 is typical of this line of deterrence research. In
this study, Grasmick and Green are concerned with the causal connec-
tions between three control-inhibitory variables (moral commitment,
perceived threat of legal punishment, and threat of social disapproval)
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1 Bailey & Lott, Crime, Punishment, and Personality.- An Examination of the Deterrence Question,
67 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 99 (1976); Burkett & Jensen, Conventional Ties, Peer Influence,
and the Fear of Apprehension: A Study of Adolescent Marijuana Use, 16 Soc. Q. 522 (1975); Jensen,
Erickson & Gibbs, Perceived Risk of Punishment and Self-Reported Delinquency , 57 Soc. FORCES 57
(1978); Meier & Johnson, Deterrence as Social Control" The Legal and Extralegal Poduction of Con-
fortity, 42 AM. Soc. REy. 292 (1977); Silberman, Towarda Theory of Criminal Deterrence, 41 AM.
Soc. REv. 442 (1976); Teevan, Subjective Perception of Deterrence, 13 J. RESEARCH CRIME &
DELINQ. 155 (1976); Waldo & Chiricos, Perceived Penal Sanction and Self-Reported Criminality: A
Neglected Approach to Deterrence Research, 19 SOC. PROB. 522 (1972).
2 Grasmick & Green, Legal Punishment, Social Disapproval and Internalization as Inhibitors of
Illegal Behavior, 71 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 325 (1980).
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and illegal behavior. Perceptual measures of each of the three inhibi-
tory variables and involvement in eight illegal behaviors were obtained
from a sample of adults. They report as evidence of a deterrent effect an
inverse relationship between the perception of legal punishment (a com-
bined index of perceived certainty and severity) measured at one point
in time and self-reportedpast involvement in illegal behavior (a compos-
ite index of eight offenses). Consistent with other, similarly-designed
studies in the perceptual deterrence literature,3 Grasmick and Green
found significant negative effects for the perception of legal punishment,
even when other inhibitory factors (moral commitment to norms and
social disapproval) were controlled.4 The Grasmick and Green paper is
typical of perceptual deterrence studies not only because they find weak
but significant deterrent effects, but also because their conclusions rest
on the analysis of cross-sectional correlations between current percep-
tions and prior behavior.
In a critical response, Greenberg5 suggested that two explanations
other than deterrence are compatible with Grasmick and Green's data.
One of these is the issue of spuriousness, which will be addressed later in
this Article. The second possible interpretation of the data is that per-
ceptions of the threat of legal punishment may be a consequence rather
than a cause of involvement in criminal conduct. Greenberg thus raises
the issue of the causal ordering of the variables in Grasmick and Green's
research, and the consequent confusion over exactly what is being ob-
served in this and other studies. Although the perceptions and behavior
indices in Grasmick and Green's research were measured at the same
time, their behavior index reflects the respondent's self-reported involve-
ment in criminal conduct at any time in thepastP The interpretation of
the negative correlation between the perception of legal punishment
and criminal behavior as a deterrent effect is based upon the relation-
ship between a hypothesized cause (perceptions of legal threat) and an
3 Grasmick and Green are well aware of the problem of temporal ordering with synchro-
nous correlations in perceptual deterrence research. Id. at 327. To overcome this problem
they also report data relating to the effect of perceptions of punishment risk on the respon-
dent's estimate of whether he will commit the offense in the future. With anticipated future
involvement as the dependent variable, any ambiguity in causal order is removed. Our com-
ments in this Article, then, are only directed at their analyses involving their measure of past
criminal involvement (Ip) and current perceptions.
4 Akers, Krohn, Lanza-Kaduce & Radosevich, Social Learning and Deviant Behavior- A Spe-
cifc Test of A General Theo,7, 44 AM. Soc. REV. 636 (1979); Jensen, Erickson & Gibbs, supra
note 1; Silberman, supra note 1.
5 Greenberg, MethodologicalIssues in Survf Research on the Inhibition of Crime, 72 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 1094 (1981).
6 Respondents were asked if they had ever committed the offense and were coded yes if
they reported committing the offense at any time in the past. Grasmick & Green, supra note
2, at 330.
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antecedent effect (criminal involvement). As Greenberg suggested in his
response to the Grasmick and Green paper, such correlations may not
reflect the fact that those with low perceptions of legal threats are more
likely to be involved in criminal acts than those who perceive a greater
threat (the effect of deterrence). Rather, the negative correlations may
reveal that those who do become involved in criminal acts and get away
with it (as most do) may subsequently lower their estimates of the risks
and threat involved (the effect of experience). 7 With cross-sectional
analyses there is simply no way to differentiate between these two likely
interpretations.
Cross-sectional data may only be used to estimate a deterrent effect
if there is considerable stability in the perceptions involved. If we can
assume that people's perceptions of the threat of legal sanctions are sta-
ble-that is, unmodified by experience-then their perceptions mea-
sured after their involvement in criminal acts will be an accurate
estimate of their perceptions before such involvement. If perceptions are
stable, then the observed negative correlations between perceptions and
criminal involvement may be interpreted as evidence of deterrence. If
perceptions are not stable over time, but are altered by experience, then
cross-sectional data cannot be used to estimate a deterrent effect. In an
early perceptual deterrence study, Silberman correctly noted the meth-
odological quandary of cross-sectional designs:
Respondents are asked at a given point in time what their current beliefs
are regarding the efficacy of the law enforcement process and then asked to
report their past criminal behavior. In order to assert that these beliefs
affect the individual's behavior, we must assume a degree of stability in
those beliefs. However, it is equally reasonable to assume that the respon-
dent's current beliefs are a product of his past behavior, particularly if he
has committed an offense and was not caught. Are we really testing deter-
rence theory? Or are we measuring the effects of past experiences on cur-
rent beliefs regarding the certainty and severity of punishment?8
The assumption of perceptual stability is critical. If current percep-
tions of legal punishment cannot be used as a proxy for earlier percep-
tions, then most of the existing perceptual deterrence literature is fatally
flawed. Testing this assumption of perceptual stability requires longitu-
dinal data. Longitudinal data will also allow a separation of deterrent
effects (Perceptions -* Behavior) from experiential effects (Behavior-o
Perceptions).
The study reported in this Article will directly test the hypothesis of
perceptual stability by empirically examining Greenberg's objection to
the use of cross-sectional designs by Grasmick and Green and others. It
7 Greenberg, supra note 5, at 1095.
8 Silberman, supra note 1, at 444.
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reports the analysis of two separate sets of data, both panel studies. In
both data sets we asked respondents at two time periods various ques-
tions relating to their assessment of the risk and cost of criminal involve-
ment and to their own involvement in criminal actions. Within both sets
of data we test the stability of perceptions and make estimates of deter-
rent and experiential effects.
For comparative purposes, we made an attempt in the course of this
analysis to duplicate as closely as possible the analysis of Grasmick and
Green. Nevertheless, important differences exist between the two stud-
ies. First, Grasmick and Green sampled from a group of adults; the two
samples in the present study are both younger, one being a sample of
college students and the second a sample of high school students. Both
samples presented here were from two independent research projects
completed before the publication of Grasmick and Green's findings. In-
asmuch as this study was not an attempt to faithfully replicate Grasmick
and Green's research, the differences in study populations pose no
problems. The deterrence doctrine nowhere claims that deterrence is an
age-specific process, and we should expect to find it operating (if it does)
across samples of differing ages and life events. In addition to sample
differences, the types of offenses analyzed in this paper differ from those
used by Grasmick and Green. The eight offenses used in their analysis
were: theft of property worth less than twenty dollars; theft of property
worth twenty dollars or more; illegal gambling; cheating on tax returns;
intentionally inflicting physical injury; littering; illegal use of fireworks
within the city limits; and driving while under the influence of alcohol.
Reflecting the younger age of our college and high school samples com-
pared to Grasmick and Green's sample, the offenses examined in our
study were: theft of goods worth under ten dollars (both samples); theft
of goods worth $10-$100 (both samples); vandalism (both samples); ma-
rijuana use (both samples); writing checks with insufficient funds (col-
lege sample); and drinking under age (high school sample). Although
only two of our offenses (theft) overlap with those used by Grasmick and
Green, there is no a priori reason to suppose that the offenses they have




Our research separately analyzes two data sets. The first data set
results from interviews with 300 college students randomly selected from
a list of freshmen enrolled at a major state university during the 1974-
1975 school year. The college sample is ninety percent white and ten
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percent non-white, forty-nine percent male and fifty-one percent female.
The figures closely approximate the race and sex composition of the
university from which the sample was drawn. Respondents were inter-
viewed between January and June of 1975 (Time 1) and again approxi-
mately one year later (Time 2).9 We collected data from the high school
students through self-administered questionnaires given first during the
fall of 1976 (Time 1) and again six months later (Time 2) to all ninth-
through twelfth-grade students attending one high school. A total of
303 students completed a Time 1 questionnaire; of these, 262 also com-
pleted a questionnaire at Time 2. The data analysis is based on these
262 high school students. The students ranged in age from thirteen to
eighteen years; seventy-seven percent of the students were white, twenty-
three percent black, forty- nine percent were male and fifty-one percent
female. This approximates the sex and racial composition of the city
within which the students resided.
B. DEPENDENT VARIABLES
Each questionnaire included a self-report criminal involvement in-
ventory. The college students were asked at both Time I and Time 2 to
report their involvement in fifteen criminal offenses "ever in the past"
and "during the previous year" (the interval between the Time 1 and
Time 2 interviews). The high school respondents at Time 1 were asked
to report their involvement in eighteen different offenses both "ever"
and "in the past 12 months." At Time 2 they were asked about identi-
cal offenses, but the intervals of recall were "ever" and "in the past 6
months" (the period between Time 1 and Time 2).
Although we asked respondents in both samples about a wide vari-
ety of illegal acts, five from each group were of particular importance:
for the college students, these were petty theft, theft of $10-$100, mari-
juana use, writing checks with insufficient funds, and vandalism; for the
high school students, they were petty theft, theft of $10-$100, marijuana
use, drinking under age, and vandalism. These offenses were of special
. 9 A more complete description of the two samples is as follows. The total 9th-12th grade
population of the high school was 350. The questionnaire administration took place in stu-
dents' English classes. On the days of the questionnaire administration at Time 1, 303 stu-
dents (87%) were in attendance and completed the questionnaire. On the days of the Time 2
administration, 302 students attended English class and completed a questionnaire, 262 of
whom also had completed a Time 1 questionnaire. In total, then, 262 students completed
both a Time 1 and Time 2 questionnaire; 41 students completed a questionnaire at Time I
only and 40 at Time 2 only; seven were absent at both times. For the college sample, 587 full-
time freshmen students were selected from a freshman class of 3005. Of the 587 students first
selected, 205 had no available address or phone number by which they could be located for
the interview (159 at Time 1; 46 at Time 2), 24 of those contacted had scheduling differences
which precluded an interview (21 at Time 1; three at Time 2), and 58 students were con-
tacted but refused to be interviewed (39 at Time 1; 19 at Time 2).
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relevance because we expected them to be the ones most likely to have
been committed. Thus, questions about perceptions of punishment risk
and severity made reference only to these offenses. The mean level of
involvement for each of the five offenses can be found in Table 1A for
the college respondents and in Table 1B for the high school respondents.
TABLE 1A
MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS FOR OFFENSE ITEMS AT TIME 1
AND TIME 2: COLLEGE SAMPLE
TIME I TIME 2
Standard Standard
Mean Deviation (N), Mean Deviation (N)
Petty Theft .72 3.49 (300) .74 3.69 (300)
Theft of $10 - S100 .06 .50 (299) .05 .30 (300)
Marijuana 23.25 82.70 (297) 30.27 113.74 (299)
Bad Checks .36 1.13 (299) .78 1.87 (300)
Vandalism .33 1.50 (296) .24 1.20 (300)
Criminal Involvement Index .91 1.01 (300) 1.23 1.58 (300)
TABLE 1B
MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS FOR OFFENSE ITEMS AT TIME 1
AND TIME 2: HIGH SCHOOL SAMPLE
TIME 1 TIME 2
Standard Standard
Mean Deviation (N) Mean Deviation (N)
Petty Theft .38 1.48 (245) .53 2.24 (252)
Theft of $I0 - S100 .05 .411 (258) .03 .222 (262)
Marijuana 31.49 145.44 (248) 43.86 187.63 (251)
Drinking 41.56 162.59 (227) 50.14 163.27 (234)
Vandalism .24 1.10 (253) .38 2.12 (251)
Criminal Involvement Index .98 1.00 (262) 1.18 1.09 (262)
We constructed a general index of criminal involvement for each
sample, coding respondents 0 at Time 1 for each offense if not commit-
ted in the past year and 1 if committed. A composite scale was then
created by summing up the five offenses. We performed an identical
procedure on the Time 2 data for the "past twelve months" offenses of
the college sample and "past six months" offenses of the high school
sample. This produced a Time 1 and Time 2 Criminal Involvement
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Index with a range of 0 to 5. The mean level for the Criminal Involve-
ment Index at Time 1 and Time 2 is reported in Table 1A for the col-
lege sample and in Table IB for the high school sample.
C. INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
We asked respondents from both the college and high school sam-
ples questions about their perceptions of the certainty and severity of
legal punishment for specific illegal acts. Identical questions were asked
at Time I and Time 2. Because the college and high school students
received different questions, the discussion treats the two groups
separately.
Five different measures of the perceived certainty of punishment
were employed in the college sample. There are two measures of the
perceived risk of arrest. One of these asks for the respondents' estimates
of their own likelihood of arrest for each of five offenses: petty theft,
theft of $10-$100, marijuana use, writing checks with insufficient funds,
and vandalism. The questions followed the format: "If you committed
'crime x,' how likely is it that you would be arrested?" The response
options ranged on a five point continuum of "very unlikely," "unlikely,"
"50/50," "likely," and "very likely." The second measure of the per-
ceived risk of arrest asks the respondent to estimate the chances of a
generalized other being arrested: "Out of the next 100 people in this
town who commit 'crime x' how many do you think will be arrested?"
Three other measures of perceived certainty, similar in format to this
measure, asked the respondents to estimate the chances of a generalized
other getting caught, of getting caught by the police, and of getting con-
victed for committing "crime x." Finally, a measure of the perceived
severity of punishment was also employed: "If you were arrested for
'crime x,' what do you think is the most likely thing that would happen
to you?" There were six ordinally ranked response options, from "given
a warning and/or released" to "convicted and sent to prison for more
than one year." Table 2A (see infra p. 279) reports group means for each
of these measures for the college sample.
We employed two measures of perceived risk with the high school
students. They were asked questions to elicit perceptions of the cer-
tainty of getting caught and the certainty of conviction for five specific
offenses: petty theft, theft of $10-$100, marijuana use, drinking under
age, and vandalism. They were also asked about their estimates of the
chances of a generalized other getting caught, and getting convicted:
"Out of the next 100 people in this town who commit 'crime x' how
many do you think will be caught?" and "How many of those people
who get caught do you think will be convicted?" In addition, for each
ROLE OF LEGAL PUNISHMENT
offense the respondents were asked about the severity of the punishment
they would likely receive: "If you were caught for 'crime x,' what do
you think would happen to you?" Response options ranged on a five
point ordinal continuum from "given a warning and released" to "sent
to prison."' 0 Table 2B (see infra p. 280) reports group means for each of
these measures for the high school sample.
To parallel the analysis of Grasmick and Green," who tested their
deterrence hypotheses using composite indices rather than offense-spe-
cific items, we also constructed composite indices of perceived certainty
and severity with the college and high school data sets. For the college
sample, five indices of perceived risk (self-arrest, other-caught, other-
caught by police, other-arrested, other-convicted) and one index of per-
ceived severity were constructed by summing and averaging the raw
scores over the five offenses. For the high school sample, two perceived
certainty indices (getting caught, getting convicted) and a perceived se-
verity index were similarly constructed. For both data sets, we con-
ducted principal components analyses of the indices. In each case, one
factor accounted for most of the variance. An examination of the factor
loadings for each item on the principal component within each set
showed all factor loadings higher than .30, with most of the loadings .60
or higher. Each of the scales was then put through a reliability analysis,
with Cronbach's alpha 2 computed as a measure of each scale's internal
reliability. All of the perception scales proved to be highly reliable. The
mean and standard deviation for each scale at each time period and its
alpha value are reported in Table 2A for the college sample and in Ta-
ble 2B for the high school sample.' 3
10 The severity measure used here for the high school and college samples is different from
that used in Grasmick and Green's research. They asked their respondents to describe "how
big a problem" their punishment would create for their life, thus operationalizing perceived
severity in terms of the personal cost of the punishment. Grasmick & Green, supra note 2, at
330. The perceived severity measure used in the present research assumes that similar punish-
ments are being perceived as similarly costly, an assumption harshly criticized by Grasmick
and Green. Perhaps this is an unwarranted assumption; additional research is clearly needed,
however, on the proper measurement of severity in perceptual deterrence research before
alternative operationalizations are rejected.
1 Grasmick & Green, supra note 2.
12 N. NIE, C. HULL, J. JENKINS, K. STEINBRENNER & D. BENT, STATISTICAL PACKAGE
FOR THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (2d ed. 1975).
13 Grasmick and Green argue at length that the correct specification of the deterrence
doctrine requires that the perception of legal punishment be measured as a multiplicative
function of perceived certainty and perceived severity. Grasmick & Green, supra note 2, at
326-31. We tested for the existence of a certainty-severity interaction on both the college and
high school data sets and found no evidence of a multiplicative effect. Our analyses showed
that perceived certainty and severity have independent, additive effects, and we used separate
measures in our study. To enable a more direct comparison with Grasmick and Green's
research, we did all analyses with an interactive term, which left findings unchanged.
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III. FINDINGS
A. PERCEPTUAL STABILITY
If perceptions of the certainty and severity of legal punishment can
be shown to be stable over time, then perceptions measured after the
occurrence of any involvement in illegal behavior may be an accurate
estimate of the respondents' pre-behavior perceptions. Only if percep-
tual stability exists do the cross-sectional correlations between percep-
tions and self-reported behavior reported by Grasmick and Green 14 and
other perceptual deterrence researchers 15 reflect the process of deter-
rence. If perceptions do not remain stable, however, then the reported
negative correlations may merely reflect the process of experience, that
is, that perceptions of legal sanctions are the consequence of criminal
activity. Tables 2A and 2B report the results of the first iests of percep-
tual stability, showing the group mean scores at Time 1 and Time 2 for
each perception item by each offense and the associated T-tests for
matched pairs.
The college sample shows that with an interval of one year between
measurements the respondents' perceptions of punishment changed con-
siderably. This is particularly true regarding the perception of the indi-
vidual's own risk of arrest. In this instance, the matched-pairs T-tests
show that for all but one offense (vandalism) the respondents' Time 2
perceptions of the risk of arrest for self are significantly lower than the
Time 1 perceptions. This is precisely the pattern one would expect from
the experiential process; committing offenses and getting away with
them results in a reduction in the estimate of the risk involved. Much
the same pattern prevails with the other measures of perceived certainty
and the measure of perceived severity, although to a less dramatic ex-
tent. The respondents' perceptions of punishment certainty and of se-
verity for marijuana use and writing bad checks were particularly
unstable.
The significant lack of perceptual stability for marijuana use and
bad checks compared with both kinds of theft and vandalism may in
part be accounted for by the fact that a greater proportion of these stu-
dents were using marijuana and writing bad checks than were stealing
and vandalizing. Forty-nine percent had used marijuana and thirty-
one percent had written at least one bad check during the Time 1 -
Time 2 interval, whereas only nine percent of these respondents re-
ported committing an act of vandalism, only sixteen percent had com-
mitted petty theft, and only three percent had committed a theft of $10-
14 Grasmick & Green, supra note 2.
15 Bailey & Lott, supra note 1; Burkett & Jensen, supra note 1; Silberman, supra note I;
Waldo & Chiricos, supra note I.
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$100. Another factor which may help account for the considerable
Time 1 - Time 2 instability of the marijuana and bad checks perceptions
is the novely of the offense in the person's experience. The occurrence of
behavior and non- occurrence of sanctions may be most salient when the
illegal behaviors are being committed for the first time. The data are
consistent with this novelty effect. Of those respondents who reported
committing petty theft during the Time 1 - Time 2 interval, only five
percent were doing it for the first time. The corresponding figure for the
theft of $10-$100 was nine percent, for vandalism six percent. For mari-
juana use and writing bad checks, the offenses for which the data show
the least perceptual stability, eighteen percent and sixty-one percent, re-
spectively, were doing it for the first time. The novelty of the behavior
in the experience of the actor does, then, appear to be a critical factor in
the experiential process.
Table 2B reports the perceptual stability test for the offense-specific
perception items from the high school data set. Since the Time 1 - Time
2 interval is six months, one-half that of the college respondents', the
perceptions of these high school students could be expected to show
greater stability. Table 2B shows quite clearly that such is not the case.
For each offense except drinking under age, the respondents' Time 2
perceptions of certainty are significantly lower than their Time 1 esti-
mates. This is true whether the measure of perceived risk is the risk of a
generalized other being caught or being convicted, and is particularly
true for marijuana use, which shows the greatest Time 1 - Time 2 differ-
ence. This offense-specific analysis shows that there is little stability in
perceptions of punishment certainty even over as short a period as six
months. Unlike the case for the college students, only for marijuana use
was the perception of punishment severity unstable over time. t6 The
most significant perceptual change for both certainty and severity of
punishment was found for marijuana use. The novelty effect of the be-
havioral experience again appears to be critical in understanding why
the least perceptual stability was observed for marijuana use. There
were substantially more respondents reporting a first-time-ever mari-
juana use (twenty-seven percent) during the six-month Time 1 - Time 2
interval than a first-time petty theft (four percent), theft of $10-$100
(eighteen percent), drinking under age (ten percent) or vandalism (nine
percent). Tittle and Logan have suggested that "a first offense may be
16 The finding that there was greater change for the measures of perceived risk than for
perceived severity should not be surprising. If the experiential process is taking place, the
finding demonstrates that criminal behavior may be engaged in without being caught-and
speaks only to the issue ofthecertainpy of punishment. Estimates of the risk of criminal behav-
ior may decline, therefore, as one becomes more experienced, while the estimate of the sever-
ity of punishment one can expect if one gets caught may go unchanged.
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more sensitive to sanctions than are repeated offenses."' 17 The findings
for these college and high school students regarding the novelty effect
suggest that a first offense may also be more sensitive to non-sanction.
The analysis of offense-specific perceptual items has thus far shown
that perceptions of punishment risk, and perhaps punishment severity,
are not stable even over short time intervals. One objection to the anal-
ysis, however, may be that these data, rather than reflecting the process
by which successful experience in criminal behavior lowers the estimate
of the risk of that behavior, reflect only the process of statistical regres-
sion to the mean. Respondents are asked to perform a novel task, that of
estimating punishment risk and severity, and may make unrealistic first
estimates which they corrected at a second administration. Although
this argument is plausible, a regression to the mean cannot account for
much of the perceptual instability observed here. In the first place, if
the data were only showing a regression effect then the least stability in
perceptions should be found for the offense where the estimates were the
highest. Such is not the case, however, as the perceived certainty and
severity of punishment for marijuana use showed the greatest change
over time for both samples even though it was consistently the offense
showing the lowest estimates of both certainty and severity. Second,
those respondents with initially high estimates of punishment risk may
also be the ones with the least experience in criminal behavior; any sub-
sequent criminal activity on their part may be more salient to their
"'naive" perceptions than for the more experienced.
It may also be the case that, although one's perceptions of the cer-
tainty and severity of punishment for a specific offense are sensitive to
one's experience (novel or continuing) and therefore are unstable, the
organired set of perceptions one may have of legal sanctions may be less
susceptible to influence by behavioral experience and more stable over
time. Table 3A and 3B report on a test of the stability of the indices of
perceived certainty and severity for both the college and high school
data sets. The data for college students in Table 3A show that even
organized sets of perceptions are not particularly stable over a one year
period. With the exception of the risk of a generalized other being
caught, the T-tests for matched pairs reveal that all of the indices are
significantly lower at Time 2 than at Time 1, consistent with the experi-
ential process. This is particularly true for the index measuring one's
personal risk of arrest (T = 4.50, p < .001). Table 3B reports the
17 Tittle & Logan, Sanctions and Deviance: Evidence and Remaining Questions, 7 LAw & Soc'Y
REv. 371, 386 (1973).
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matched pairs T-tests for perceptual indices within the high school sam-
ple. The earlier finding of a lack of perceptual stability for perceived
certaintyis corroborated. For both indices (getting caught, getting ar-
rested), the Time 2 measure of perceived risk is significantly lower than
the Time 1 measure.
These data are critically important. Even with as short a time in-
terval as six months and with generalized indices, perceptions measured
at a later time are not good estimates of earlier perceptions.' 8 Collec-
tively, then, the findings from the two data sets do not support the cru-
cial assumption of perceptual stability that underlies cross-sectional
deterrence research. Indeed, they strongly point to the existence of an
independent experiential effect, an effect other than that which Gras-
mick and Green and other perceptual deterrence researchers have been
reporting.
B. DETERRENT AND EXPERIENTIAL EFFECTS
The experiential effect is the effect of one's behavioral experience
on perceptions of punishment risk. As such, it can best be measured by
the relationship between behavior and subsequent perceptions ( B --> P).
The deterrent effect is the effect of one's perceptions of legal punishment
on involvement in illegal actions and is measured by the relationship
between perceptions and subsequent behavior (P -> B). As the preced-
ing section has just shown, the measurement of the deterrent effect re-
quires longitudinal data. The two data sets examined here contain two-
wave panel data where respondents were asked at both Time 1 and
Time 2 about their current perceptions and prior involvement in crimi-
nal behavior. This data allows the estimation of two experiential effects
and one deterrent effect for each data set.' 9 For the college sample, one
18 In showing that perceptions changed significantly even over a six month period, our
results seriously challenge the validity of Grasmick and Green's use of an "ever involved"
behavior measure in estimating a deterrent effect. Their data require an even more stringent
assumption: thai the perceptions of their adult respondents remained stable over a prolonged
("ever") and unknown period of time.
19 In terms of the causal ordering of the variables, the deterrence-experiential process de-
scribed by our two wave-two variable model is as follows:
a
pi
c e Z d
B, b B,
FIGURE ONE
where a represents the parameter for perceptual stability, c and d are the two experiential
effects, and e is the deterrent effect. It is helpful to remember here that although B, and P,
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experiential effect reflects the relationship between behavior in the year
prior to Time 1 with Time 1 perceptions (B, -- P,); a second reflects the
relationship between offenses committed in the year period in between
Time I and Time 2 and perceptions measured at Time 2 (B2 --3 P 2). For
the high school sample, one experiential effect measures the relationship
between behavior in the year preceding Time 1 and Time 1 perceptions
(BI --* PI); the second experiential effect measures the relationship be-
tween offenses committed in the six-month period between Time 1 and
Time 2 and perceptions measured at Time 2 (B2 -- ) P 2). For both sam-
ples, the deterrent effect is measured by the relationship between per-
ceptions measured at Time 1 and behavior engaged in during the period
between Time 1 and Time 2 and reported at Time 2 (P1 --* B2).
Tables 4 and 5 report the experiential and deterrent effects for the
two data sets. Table 4 presents the offense-specific analysis, while Table
5 shows the analysis using the perceptual and behavioral indices. Table
4 reports the associations with both gamma and Pearson's r. Earlier
analyses of this data revealed that one would be led to different substan-
tive interpretations depending upon whether the data were treated as
interval or were first collapsed and then analyzed.20 The appropriate
measure of association to use is not quite clear. Although most of the
variables are meant to be interval level, most are moderately skewed
and one (our self-referenced measure of certainty) has dubious interval
properties. For this reason, the data reported in Table 4 were analyzed
both before (Pearson's r) and after (gamma) collapsing, using Pear-
son's r and gamma, respectively. For purposes of gamma, the offense
items in both data sets were dichotomized into "never committed" the
offense during the period in question and "committed the offense one or
more times." The perceptual items were trichotomized into "high,"
"medium," and "low" certainty or severity.
Table 4A shows that for the college data set the experiential rela-
tionship is consistently stronger than the deterrent relationship. For
each offense and each different measure of perceived certainty and the
measure of perceived severity, one or both of the experiential effects is
generally larger in magnitude than the deterrent effect. This is true
whether one examines the data with Pearson's r or gamma. Table 4A
shows thirty possible three-way gamma and Pearson's r comparisons
(Time 1 experiential vs. Time 2 experiential vs. deterrent effect). Using
gamma, both experiential effects are stronger than the deterrent effect
twenty-two times, one of the experiential effects is stronger and
are measured at the same time, B, is lagged because it measures behavior prior to P. The
same is true for the B2 -* P2 relationship.
20 Paternoster, Saltzman, Chiricos & Waldo, Perceived Risk and Deterrence: Methodological
Artifacts in Perceptual Deterrence Research, 73 J. GRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1238, 1255 (1982).
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TABLE 4A
GAMMA AND PEARSONIAN CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS BETWEEN
PERCEPTIONS OF LEGAL PUNISHMENT AND SPECIFIC OFFENSES:
COLLEGE SAMPLE
TIME I TIME 2
ExPERIENITAL EXPERIENIIAL DF1'ERREN'
EFFEC' (Bl-.P) EFFECT (B2-.P2) EF-ECr (PI--.B 9 )
Perception of: G (r) G (r) G (r)









Generalized Other Being Caught
Petty Theft -. 21 (-.09)
Theft 1o -s100 -. 42 (-.07)
Marijuana -. 36c (-. 13)b
Bad Checks .06 ( .05)
Vandalism -. 19 (-.1 )a
Generalized Other Being Caught by Police
Petty Theft














Generalized Other Being Arrested
Petty Theft -. 33 a (-.08)
Theft SIO -SI00 -. 20 (-.09)
Marijuana -.33
c  (-.1 )a
Bad Checks -. 51
c  (I 7)b
Vandalism -. 28 (-.1 )a
Generalized Other Being Convicted
Petty Theft -. 3 1a (-.07)
Theft SO -S100 -. 13 (-.07)
Marijuana -.. Ob (-. 10)a
Bad Checks -. 46 b (-.16)
b
Vandalism -. 30a (-. 10 )a
Severity of Punishment for Self
Petty Theft -. 33 (-.08)
Theft So - 100 .27 (-.10)
a
Marijuana -. 02 (-.04)
Bad Checks -. 3 1a (-. 18 )c
Vandalism -. 23 (-. 10)a
.46
b  
(-. 10 )a -. 30 a (-.04)
-. 62
c  
(-. 20 )c -. 50 (-.07)
-. 23 (-. 10 )a -.33 (--.1 )a
-.53
c  
(-. 2 3)c -. 10 . (-.08)
-.54b (-. 17)b -. 29 
(-.1 1 )a
-. 16 a ( .01) -. 14 ( .01)
-. 49 (-.1 )a -. 27 (-.04)
-. 31
c  (-.08) -. 28 b (-.()g)a
.14 (-.02) .00 (-.04)
-. 20 (-. 12)a -. 20 (-. 10 )a
-. 28 a ( .05) -. 27 ( .04)
-.34 (-.1 0)a -. 10 (-.04)
-. 2 7b (-.06) -. 24 a (-.07)
-.37
c  (-. 15)b .01 (-.03)
-. 33 (-. I )a -. 06 (-.08)
-. 23 (. 10)a -. 22 ( .07)
-. 51 (-.10) -. 51 (-.08)
-. 2 4a (-.04) -. 2 5a (-.07)
-. 19 (-.1 3 )b .01 (-.03)
-. 26 (-. 10 )a -. 17 (-. 09 )a
-. 14 ( .12)a -. 09 ( . 12 )a
-. 23 (-.08) -. 52 (-. 10 )a
-. 2 8b (-.03) -. 18 (-.06)
-. 2 5b (-. 13 )b -. 02 (-.06)
-. 25 (-.09) -. 17 ( --.,I)a
(-.03) -. 19 (-.08)
( .00) .08 (-.03)
(-.01) -. 05 ( .00)
(-. 0 9 )a -. 14 (-.05)
(-.01) -. 03 (-.02)
a p < .05
b p < .01
c p < .001
Self Being Arrested
Petty Theft
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one weaker five times, they are the same two times, and in only one
instance is gamma for the deterrent effect larger than both experiential
effects. The same pattern applies to the Pearsonian coefficients: in
fifteen cases both experiential effects are larger, in eleven cases one of the
experiential effects is larger than the deterrent effect while the other is
not, in three cases they are the same, and in only one case is the deter-
rent effect larger than both experiential effects. A most striking compar-
ison can be made between the Time 2 experiential effect and the
deterrent effect for the risk of one's self being arrested. For each offense,
the relationship between past behavior and the risk of one's own arrest
consistently shows a moderately strong and significant experiential ef-
fect. The corresponding deterrent relationships, however, are generally
weaker and non-significant. All but one of the experiential correlations
are significant, whereas only three out of ten deterrence relationships
reach statistical significance.
Table 4B presents the relevant experiential-deterrent comparisons
for the high school sample, showing the same pattern as the college data
set. The magnitudes of the correlations are consistently larger for the
experiential than the deterrent effect. This is particularly true for the
two measures of perceived certainty. For the ten three-way comparisons
(two experiential effects, one deterrent effect) with gamma as the meas-
ure of association, the two experiential effects are both larger than the
deterrent effect in eight instances. In two cases one of them is larger and
one weaker than the deterrent effect, while in no case is the deterrent
effect equivalent to or larger than any of the experiential effects. In
comparing the effects using Pearson's r, the two experiential effects are
stronger than the deterrent effect in three instances while at least one of
them is larger in eight others. As with gamma, none of the Pearson
correlation coefficients for the deterrent effect is larger than the corre-
sponding values for the experiential effect. There is little difference be-
tween Time 1 and Time 2 experiential effects even though the time
interval for the first effect is twelve months and the second only six
months. It would appear from this, then, that substantial experiential
effects may be produced even over short time intervals. The greater
magnitude of the experiential relationship is less pronounced for the
perceived severity measure in the high school sample; the deterrent ef-
fect is fairly moderate in strength for all offenses and generally larger
than the experiential effect. Thus, for the high school respondents, the
experience of committing illegal acts and getting away with them is
likely to lead them to modify their estimates of the risk of getting caught
rather than their estimates of the penalties should they be discovered.
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TABLE 4B
GAMMA AND PEARSONIAN CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS BETWEEN
PERCEPTIONS OF LEGAL PUNISHMENT AND SPECIFIC OFFENSES:
HIGH SCHOOL SAMPLE
TiME I TIME 2
EXPERIEN'I ZAL EXPERIE'IAL DEIERRENt'
E-"wr (BI-.P1 ) EFFE'- (B--P2 ) EFFEar (PI--B2)
Perception of- G (r) G (r) G (r)
Generalized Other Being Caught
Petty Theft -. 5 4 c (-.1 9 )c -. 13 (-.04) -. 30 
(-. 1 1 )a
Theft Sl0 - $100 -. 79 (-.14)
b  
-. 63 (-.06) -. 15 (-.05)
Marijuana -. 4 8c (-.1 5)b -. 58
c  (-.10) -. 38 b  ( .03)
Drinking -. 3 2a (-.09) - 31 a (-. 13)a -1.8 (-.09)
Vandalism -. 17 (-.Il)a -. 29 a (-.10) -. 12 (-.10)
Generalized Other Being Convicted
Petty Theft -. 34 a (- 16)b .01 (-.07) -. 23 (-.09)
Theft Slo -Soo -. 77 (-.13) a  -. 59 (-.05) -. 34 (-.08)
Marijuana -.51c  (-. 15)b -.45
c  (-.06) -.32b (-.08)
Drinking -. 22 (-.07) -. 3 4b (-.10) -. 17 (-.06)
Vandalism -. 12 (-.08) -. 23 (-.09) -. 10 (-.09)
Severity of Punishment for Self
Petty Theft .13 (-.02) -. 13 (-.03) - 5 6 b (-.10)
Theft Slo - SI00 -1.00 (-.04) -1.00 (-.05) -. 24 (-.05)
Marijuana -. 65
c  (-. 14)b -. 25 ( .00) -. 52
c  (-. 13 )a
Drinking -. 30 a (.02) -. 25 (-.02) -. 17 (-.05)
Vandalism .10 (.00) -. 08 (-.03) -. 21 (_ 10 )a
a p < .05
b p <.01
C p < .001
Deterrence researchers have repeatedly claimed that the perception
of legal threats plays a significant role in social control. Their evidence
supporting this claim is the finding of moderate correlations between
current perceptions and prior behavior. The above analyses show, how-
ever, that these correlations describe not a deterrent but an experiential
effect. The data find moderately strong correlations between present
perceptions and prior behavior-the experiential effect. The true deter-
rent effect appears to be much weaker than earlier researchers have sug-
gested. Indeed, in Tables 4A and 4B most of the deterrence
relationships are weak and non-significant. It would appear from this,
then, that offense-specific perceptions of punishment threat may be in-
consequential factors in producing conformity.
As Silberman 2' and Grasmick and Green 22 have noted, however,
21 Silberman, supra note 1.
22 Grasmick & Green, supra note 2.
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perceptions of the threat of punishment may be organized around a set
of rules and prohibitions rather than a single regulation. It is possible,
then, that more substantial deterrent effects can be found if one corre-
lates global measures of perceived certainty and severity with a measure
of overall criminal involvement. The data in Table 5 examine that is-
sue. Since the scale construction procedures generated variables that
more clearly reflect interval level properties, Pearson's r is a more appro-
priate measure of association. Since, however, many deterrence re-
searchers have reported their results with gamma as the measure of
association, we also calculated gamma after collapsing for comparison.
With respect to the college sample (Table 5A), the data do show consis-
tent evidence of a weak deterrent effect. For each measure of perceived
risk and for perceived severity, the r coefficient is both negative and
significant. In addition, a personal measure of perceived risk appears to
be more important for deterrence than an other-referenced measure,
consistent with other research. 23 The experiential effects are again gen-
erally larger in magnitude than the corresponding deterrent effect. All
but two of the r values for the experiential effect are larger than the
corresponding r for the deterrent effect. Further, in looking at the Time
I experiential effect, the data suggest that just as a self-referenced meas-
ure of risk is more vital for deterrence, it may also be more significant
than an other-referenced measure in the experiential process. For the
self-referenced measure of risk, both Pearson's r and gamma are substan-
tially larger than any of the other-referenced measures. The generality
of this is difficult to determine, however, since the pattern is not re-
peated with the Time 2 experiential effect.
As with the college respondents, the high school data set (Table 5B)
shows a weak but significant deterrent effect for each of the perception
indices. A close correspondence exists between the two groups with re-
spect to the magnitude of Pearson's r for the deterrent effect. For both
groups the value of r for the perceived certainty measures vary between
r = -. 14 and -. 18, suggesting some consistency in the deterrent effect
despite sample characteristic and measurement differences. Also, as was
true for the college data set, the correlations for the experiential effect on
perceived certainty are all larger than the deterrent effect. The experi-
ential and deterrent effects for perceived severity are virtually the same.
It must be noted here that despite the finding of a deterrent effect for
both data sets, our r values are all considerably smaller than the deter-
rent effect reported by Grasmick and Green.2 4 The correlation between
23 Jensen, Erickson & Gibbs, supra note 1; Waldo & Chiricos, supra note I.
24 Grasmick & Green, supra note 2, at 333.
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their legal sanctions variable and index of past criminal conduct was
r = -. 40, p < .00 1.25 That correlation is best understood as reflecting an
experiential effect. The value of r for Grasmick and Green's "deterrent"
effect is closer to the values reported here as the experiential effect.
Although the true deterrent effect is substantially smaller than that
reported by Grasmick and Green, the data show consistent evidence of a
weak but significant negative relationship between perceptions of pun-
ishment threat and subsequent criminal involvement. Even these corre-
lations, however, cannot qualify as unambiguous support for the
deterrence doctrine. As Gibbs26 has warned, any observed relationship
between perceived sanctions and behavior may be spurious, with the
correlations being produced by extra-legal factors such as moral con-
demnation of the acts involved or social disapproval of the acts by
others. Much to their credit, Grasmick and Green controlled for such
spurious relationships by including in their regression analysis the moral
commitment to legal norms and social disapproval. Even after such
controls, they found a non-vanishing relationship between perceived le-
gal punishment and prior criminal involvement. 2 7 Again, however, their
data do not address the deterrence relationship but merely demonstrate
that the experiential relationship was not spurious. To test for the spuri-
ousness of the deterrent effect found in the two data sets reported on
here, we conducted a regression analysis similar to that of Grasmick and
Green. Time 2 criminal involvement was regressed on Time 1 measures
of perceived certainty, severity, moral commitment, and social disap-
proval.28 In this analysis only the composite perception and behavior
25 Id.
26 J. GIBBS, CRIME, PUNISHMENT AND DETERRENCE (1975).
27 Grasmick & Green, supra note 2, at 334.
28 A moral commitment and a social disapproval scale were constructed by a procedure
identical to that used for the other scales employed in this research. To measure moral com-
mitment, we asked both the college and high school respondents to respond to the following
item: "Whether or not you get caught, it is always wrong to commit 'crime x.'" The item
was asked in reference to each of the five specific offenses already discussed and response
options ranged from "strongly agree" to "strongly disagree." The wording of these questions
is similar to that used by Grasmick and Green in their study. The scale was produced by
summing and averaging across the five offenses. We then subjected each scale to a principal
component factor analysis. For the college data set, a one-factor model fit the data, and all
loadings on the first component were .63 or higher. For the high school data set, a one-factor
model fit well with loadings on the first principal component ranging from .64 to .89. Both
scales were then given a reliability check, Cronbach's alpha was .71 for the college and .82 for
the items from the high school sample.
To measure social disapproval, we asked the college students to respond to the question:
"If you were to commit 'crime x' how do you think - would react?" The question was
asked for all five offenses; the referent for the reaction was mother, father, boyfriend or girl-
friend, and best friend. Response options ranged on a five point continuum from "strongly
disapprove" to "strongly approve." We asked the high school respondents an identical set of
questions, with mother, father, best friend and teacher as the object reacting. A scale was
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scales were used because they more clearly have interval properties than
do the offense-specific items, and they demonstrated the strongest and
most consistent evidence of a deterrent effect in the earlier analyses.
Table 6A describes the additive effect of the three inhibitory vari-
ables on the Time 2 measure of criminal involvement for the college
respondents. In each case, the independent variables are one of the
composite measures of perceived legal punishment, the index measuring
social disapproval, and the index measuring moral commitment to the
rules. The data from each separate regression analysis are uniform in
showing that once other inhibitory factors are controlled, perceived le-
gal threat has very little deterrent effect. In comparing the direct effects
of the three variables, the beta coefficient (standardized regression coef-
ficient) for the legal threat variable is the lowest of the three in every
TABLE 6A
MULTIPLE REGRESSION FOR DETERRENT EFFECT: RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN TIME I INHIBITORY VARIABLES AND SUBSEQUENT
BEHAVIOR-COLLEGE SAMPLE
Beta b p
Self Being Arrested -. 068 -. 142 .266
Social Disapproval -. 113 -. 534 .120
Moral Commitment -. 182 -. 481 .011
Generalized Other Being Caught -. 124 -. 013 .030
Social Disapproval -. 114 -. 539 .105
Moral Commitment -. 182 -. 481 .010
Generalized Other Being Caught by Police -. 074 -. 009 .208
Social Disapproval -. 117 -. 551 .103
Moral Commitment -. 189 -. 491 .009
Generalized Other Being Arrested -. 069 -. 009 .238
Social Disapproval -. 117 -. 552 .104
Moral Commitment -. 187 -. 495 .008
Generalized Other Being Convicted -. 070 -. 010 .234
Social Disapproval -. 117 -. 552 .103
Moral Commitment -. 187 -. 494 .008
Severity of Punishment for Self -. 048 -. 098 .420
Social Disapproval -. 119 -. 561 .103
Moral Commitment -. 192 -. 508 .006
constructed for both samples by summing and averaging across the five offenses. A principal
component factor analysis and reliability check was performed on the scale items. In both
data sets, a one-factor model fit the data; all factor loadings for the principal component were
.30 or higher for the college sample and .40 for the high school respondents. Cronbach's
alpha for the social disapproval scale was .86 for the college data set and .91 for the high
school data set.
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case but one. In every instance the variable with the most explanatory
power is moral commitment, which has the largest beta value and is
significant at the .01 level in all six regressions. Although it never
reaches statistical significance, the effect of social disapproval is the sec-
ond-best predictor in five of the six analyses. Only for the perceived
threat of a generalized other being caught is there a significant deterrent
effect once other inhibitors are controlled, and even then it is not the
best predictor of subsequent criminal involvement. The high school
data also show. the absence of any strong deterrent effect for perceived
legal punishment. Table 6B reveals that in each instance the best ex-
planatory variable is the respondent's moral commitment to the rules; in
all three cases it had the largest beta and was significant at the .001
level. Unlike the college sample, however, the second-best predictor for
the high school sample was the legal threat variable, although in no case
did it attain statistical significance.
Grasmick and Green significantly misinterpreted their data, reach-
ing the critically erroneous conclusion that the perceived threat of legal
punishment is part of an "exhaustive set of factors which inhibit illegal
behavior. '2 9 Their data collection strategy does not allow such a con-
clusion since they were not really examining the deterrent effect. The
analysis reported here suggests quite the opposite conclusion: perceived
certainty and severity of formal legal punishment play almost no role as
a deterrent.
TABLE 6B
MULTIPLE REGRESSION FOR DETERRENT EFFECT: RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN TIME 1 INHIBITORY VARIABLES AND SUBSEQUENT
BEHAVIOR-HIGH SCHOOL SAMPLE
Beta b p
Generalized Other Being Caught -. 113 -. 007 .065
Social Disapproval -. 061 -. 161 .394
Moral Commitment -. 273 -. 387 .000
Generalized Other Being Convicted -. 100 -. 007 .104
Social Disapproval -. 061 -. 160 .399
Moral Commitment -. 277 -. 393 .000
Severity of Punishment for Self -. 112 -. 221 .064
Social Disapproval -. 059 -. 157 .407
Moral Commitment -. 282 -. 400 .000
29 Grasmick & Green, supra note 2, at 334.
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IV. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
For a number of years, perceptual deterrence researchers have been
reporting negative correlations between measures of perceived legal
punishment and illegal behavior as evidence of a deterrent effect. In
their recent article, Grasmick and Green utilize refined measures but
retain the cross-sectional strategy of deterrence research. They found a
significant relationship between perceived legal punishment and crimi-
nal behavior even after controls for other inhibitory factors. It has been
argued that before such cross-sectional correlations be used as support
for the deterrence doctrine, there must be considerable stability in the
perceptions involved. Without such stability, perceptual deterrence re-
searchers may simply be reporting the change that criminal behavior
produces on estimates of punishment certainty and severity. Using two
sets of panel data, one from college students and another from high
school students, our data revealed little perceptual stability over time,
even over as short a time span as six months. Personal estimates of risk
were less stable than estimates of the risk for a generalized other. Per-
ceptions were no more stable even when measured as an organized set;
composite scales of certainty and severity also showed significant change
over time.
In finding little stability in perceptions of legal punishment, the
data raise questions about the conclusions of prior deterrence studies
and suggest the importance of the experiential effect-the effect of be-
havior on perceptions. Using panel data, we calculated independent de-
terrent and experiential effects for both groups of respondents and found
the zero-order correlation between Time I behavior and Time 2 percep-
tions (experiential effect) to be consistently stronger than the effect of
Time 1 perceptions on Time 2 behavior (the deterrent effect). The ex-
periential effect was particularly strong with self-referenced measures of
perceived risk. The finding of greater perceptual change and stronger
experiential effects for personal estimates of risk may account for the
stronger relationships with these measures found in the literature and
mistakenly interpreted as showing the salience of self-referenced meas-
ures for the deterrence process.
Even though the true deterrent effect was weaker than what the
literature had suggested, however, the zero-order correlations revealed
evidence of a deterrent effect. Once regression analysis introduced con-
trols for other inhibitory factors (moral commitment and social disap-
proval), however, all but one of the negative correlations were reduced
to non-significant levels. These findings thus offer little support to the
deterrence doctrine. Rather, they bolster Greenberg's objection that
Grasmick and Green's and almost all of the earlier perceptual research
tell us nothing about deterrence effects.
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Clearly, additional research is necessary, particularly regarding the
experiential effect. Other variables besides experience in criminal be-
havior affect perceptions of the threat of punishment. One of these cer-
tainly is one's experience with actual sanctions. It seems plausible that
some kinds of perceived risk (for example, the risk of arrest) may be
substantially affected if one were to be apprehended for a criminal act
but received informal disposition of one's case. It also seems reasonable
to expect a positive experiential effect in instances where criminal in-
volvement does result in apprehension and arrest. Perceptions can be
influenced not only by one's own experience in criminal behavior or
experience with formal sanctions, but may also be affected by
knowledge of other's experience. In general, since perceived certainty
and severity have been independent variables in deterrence research, little
is known about how perceptions are shaped and reshaped over time.
